Articulating a Modern Approach to FCC Competition Policy

From Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog: Articulating a Modern Approach to FCC Competition Policy “Reed E. Hundt, McKinsey & Company Inc. and Gregory L. Rosston, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research are Articulating a Modern Approach to FCC Competition Policy. ABSTRACT: The FCC has taken three different competition policy approaches: the classic role...

What a Difference a Year Makes: An Emerging Consensus on the Treatment of Standard-Essential Patents

From Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog: What a Difference a Year Makes: An Emerging Consensus on the Treatment of Standard-Essential Patents “Jonathan Kanter (Cadwalader) notes What a Difference a Year Makes: An Emerging Consensus on the Treatment of Standard-Essential Patents. ABSTRACT: These days, it is difficult to identify an antitrust issue that is generating more discussion than standard-essential patents. To...

Vertical Restraints for On-line Sales

From Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog: Vertical Restraints for On-line Sales “The OECD has released Vertical Restraints for On-line Sales. ABSTRACT: The OECD Competition Committee discussed vertical restraints for on-line sales in February 2013. This document includes an executive summary of that debate, a detailed summary of discussion and the...

Another Means-Plus-Function Patent: Invalid as Indefinite

From Patent Law Blog (Patently-O): Another Means-Plus-Function Patent: Invalid as Indefinite “By Dennis Crouch Ibormeith IP v. Mercedes-Benz (Fed. Cir. 2013) Ibormeith’s patent covers a "sleepiness monitor" intended to sense when a vehicle driver is getting sleepy. This is obviously an important topic that results in thousands of annual traffic...

Still on Pinckney, the CJEU, offline distribution and Latin mottos

From The IPKat: Still on Pinckney, the CJEU, offline distribution and Latin mottos “ Ian is simply the best at telling Brussels I-related jokes  Private international law as applied to online IP infringements is notoriously a topic for endless discussions, whether during social gatherings or within more formal settings.  Following yesterday’s post on Case C-170/12 Pinckney, the IPKat has received an additional contribution from learned Dr Ge Chen (University of Cambridge), who will also present on this very topic during tomorrow’s CIPIL Lecture (you can see the other events scheduled for what in Cambridge is knowns as the Michaelmas Term here).  Here’s what Ge writes: "The CJEU is an exciting institution [Merpel has always thought so]. It often drops bombs in reference cases that pose thorny questions such as the application of Article 5(3) of the Brussels I. Last time it was in eDate/Martinez, where the Court broke through the jurisdiction rule long entrenched in Shevill, prioritising the “centre of interests” of personality rights as the place of damages and allowing full damages to be awarded there. This time, the CJEU again drops three dramatic bombs in Pinckney, dissenting with the AG’s Opinion and rendering somewhat unexpected answers to French Cour de Cassation’s seemingly irrelevant questions. To understand Pinckney, a basic fact should never be overlooked: the reference questions were about online copyright infringement (online distribution of infringing CDs as conducted by UK dealers, which seemed not to be in dispute, and making infringing contents available online, which was completely hypothetical), whereas the infringement committed by the defendant in question was the reproduction of CDs (alas! the Austrian company admitted it to challenge French courts’ jurisdiction), plus an implied (but certain) act of offline distribution, without...

Patently Obvious: Why Seeking Injunctions on Standard-Essential Patents Subject to a FRAND Commitment Can Violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act

From CPI RSS: Patently Obvious: Why Seeking Injunctions on Standard-Essential Patents Subject to a FRAND Commitment Can Violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act “ Technical standards are a necessary exception to a competitive marketplace based upon feature differentiation, but they pose risks because of the market power they confer on holders of standard-essential patents ("SEPs," which generally speaking are technically essential and must be licensed in order to implement the standard). This is particularly true when the standard is widely adopted and there are no reasonable alternatives to its use.  In such circumstances, a SEP owner can use the threat of an injunction to extract supracompetitive royalties or exclude competition entirely. This "lock-in" and related market power is what distinguishes SEPs from typical "differentiating patents" that are not incorporated into a formal standard-and is what makes Section 2 of the Sherman Act a powerful and appropriate tool to regulate SEP abuse. The basic aim of the patent system is to create strong incentives to innovate and compete through feature differentiation, leading to consumer choice and competitive markets. As part of the patent grant, owners of differentiating patents may license their patents for a royalty, or enforce their rights to exclude infringers through an injunction or an action for damages. These rights, on their own, do not confer market power on the owner of a differentiating patent. Free riders (would-be infringers) can choose to work around differentiating patents or license the patented technology if it is available. And when disputes arise and a differentiating patent holder seeks to exercise its right to exclude via an injunction, the usual eBay factors...