Complicity and Compliance

by | Feb 20, 2012 | Antitrust, Competition, Featured, Fines

My third column for the E!Sharp website has been published. It looks at the arguments for and against rewarding corporate compliance programmes by granting a reduction in competition fines if the companies are nevertheless caught breaking the competition rules: If a company stays out of just one cartel because of the compliance programme, the fine that it avoids will pay for the programme many times over. If you think compliance programmes are expensive, try non-compliance. And if that is not a sufficient incentive, a reduction of a fine where they have engaged in a cartel will make no difference at all. UPDATE: The article is no longer available on the ESharp website, so I’m reposting it here: Complicity and Compliance “Does the defence have anything to say in mitigation before I pass sentence?” “Yes, my lord. If it please the court, before robbing the bank in question, my client walked past three other banks. As he did so, he repeated to himself a mantra, ‘I must not rob banks, I must not rob banks.’ He had taught himself this mantra as a way to avoid falling into the temptation of criminal activity. However, he finally succumbed to that temptation and robbed the fourth bank. My client would like his sentence for robbing the fourth bank reduced on account of his not having robbed the first three.” “Really, counsel?” “Yes, my lord.” This is absurd, but it is very similar to a campaign by some multi-national corporations to reduce their – potential future – fines for breaking competition rules. The analogy isn’t perfect, but it’s closer than they would like....